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Donor payoffs and other-regarding preferences
in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)
Jeffrey R. Stevens
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development,
Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany

Abstract  

Introduction

Helping others at no cost to oneself is a simple way
to demonstrate other-regarding preferences. Yet, primates exhibit mixed results for other-regarding preferences: chimpanzees and tamarins do not show these
effects, whereas capuchin monkeys and marmosets
preferentially give food to others. One factor of relevance to this no-cost food donation is the payoff to the
donor. Though donors always receive the same payoffs regardless of their choice, previous work varies in
whether they receive either a food reward or no food reward. Here, I tested cotton-top tamarins in a preferential giving task. Subjects could choose from two tools,
one of which delivered food to a partner in an adjacent
cage and the other of which delivered food to an empty
cage. Thus, subjects could preferentially give or withhold food from a partner. I varied whether subjects received food payoffs, whether a partner was present or
absent, and whether the partner was a non-cagemate
or the subject’s mate. Results showed that the subjects’
overall motivation to pull either tool declined when
they did not receive any food. Additionally, they did
not preferentially donate or withhold food, regardless of
their own payoff or their relationship with the partner.
Thus, cotton-top tamarins do not take advantage of costfree food giving, either when they might gain in the future (mates) or when they have no opportunity for future interactions (non-cagemates).

Self-interest lies at the heart of evolutionary and economic views of decision making. Evolutionary analyses of behavior predict that altruism (helping others at
an expense to one’s own fitness) will not spread through
a population because non-altruists will have higher fitness. Behaviors that appear altruistic actually result in
return benefits through various mechanisms such as
reciprocity, kin selection, reputation formation, or punishment (Dugatkin 1997). Similarly, economic models
assume that decision makers focusing on self-interest
will outcompete altruists in the marketplace. In classical
economic theory, an individual’s utility function does
not include payoffs to others (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947). However, a rich literature in behavioral
economics demonstrates that humans, in fact, do behave
in ways that benefit others (Camerer 2003). Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) present a model in which, rather than focusing exclusively on the payoffs to self, the outcomes
of other agents factor into the utility functions of individuals. Once decision makers include the payoffs of
others in their utility functions, they should attend to
the outcomes of others and demonstrate “other-regarding preferences”.
Recently, comparative psychologists have applied the
behavioral economic framework, including a regard for
the outcome of others, to non-human animals, especially
primates. A study of cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) showed that individuals spontaneously gave food
to another unrelated individual in repeated reciprocity
games, although this sharing decreased over time (Chen
and Hauser 2005; Hauser et al. 2003). In addition, the
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tamarins rarely gave food to pure defectors, suggesting
that any giving that occurred likely did not result from a
general propensity to help others.
One way to test for other-regarding preferences in
a more straightforward manner is to remove the costs
associated with helping others. Stevens and Stephens
(2004) tested this in blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) by allowing them to give food to another individual at no
cost to themselves. In this situation, individual subjects
gave food in over 70% of the trials, whereas in a situation with a cost to cooperating (Prisoner’s Dilemma),
they gave food in less than 40% of the trials. Early work
on cost-free generosity in primates, however, failed to
show other-regarding preferences. Chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes), one of the most cooperative primate species
(de Waal 2003; Melis et al. 2006a, b; Muller and Mitani
2005), did not demonstrate any regard for the food payoffs of other individuals. In two different tasks, chimpanzees could choose one of two options. Both options
resulted in food rewards for the chooser, but only one
option provided food to a partner. Chimpanzees failed
to preferentially choose the option that delivered food
to the partner when compared to a condition with no
partner present (Jensen et al. 2006; Silk et al. 2005; Vonk
et al. 2008).
Experiments with New World monkeys, however,
have provided stronger evidence of other-regarding
preferences. For example, in a study modeled after Silk
et al. (2005), Burkart and colleagues (2007) showed that
common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) preferentially
gave food to a partner when facing no cost. The authors
proposed that cooperative breeding has provided a
strong evolutionary force shaping other-regarding preferences, and this explains why marmosets and humans
(Burkart and van Schaik 2009; Hrdy 2005) show these
preferences but chimpanzees do not. This interpretation
is, however, weakened based on the evidence that capuchin monkeys also show other-regarding preferences
in similar tasks (de Waal et al. 2008; Lakshminarayanan
and Santos 2008). Thus, cooperative breeding is not necessary for the evolution of other-regarding preferences.
To further complicate the comparative data thus far and
erode the significance of cooperative breeding, Cronin et
al. (2009) conducted a similar test with the cooperatively
breeding cotton-top tamarin, a New World monkey that
shares many life history and anatomical traits with common marmosets. Tamarins failed to preferentially give
food to their partners even with no cost, leading the authors to reject cooperative breeding as a sufficient factor
in the evolution of other-regarding preferences.
One important aspect of other-regarding preferences is the role of food rewards for the potential donor.
Though donors always receive the same payoffs regardless of their choice, the studies mentioned here vary in
whether the donor receives a food payoff (Table 1). In
some studies, subjects chose between (1, 0) and (1, 1)
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(payoff to donor, payoff to recipient), whereas in others, the donor received no payoff, instead choosing between (0, 0) versus (0, 1). Jensen et al. (2006) and Cronin
et al. (2009) offered both types of donor payoffs and but
across different experiments.
The present study investigates how the payoff to the
donor influences his or her motivation to give food to
the partner. To directly compare the effect of donor payoff on other-regarding preferences, I offered subjects
both (1, 0) versus (1, 1) and (0, 0) versus (0, 1) choices in
the same sessions. In addition, I compared a social condition to a non-social condition to control for the role of
the presence of the partner. I also presented tamarins
with an opportunity to give food when paired with either a genetically unrelated individual from a different
group or their mate. Together, these factors explore how
donor payoffs and partner relationships influence otherregarding preferences.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
I tested five cotton-top tamarins (two males) as subjects (ID, PB, EN, RB, SH) and seven tamarins (four
males) as partners (ID, PB, RW, SP, EM, EN, RB). All
subjects were adults (4–9 years old) housed at the Cognitive Evolution Laboratory at Harvard University and
tested from June–November 2003. All subjects had participated in previous experiments, including a previous cooperation experiment (Hauser et al. 2003). In the
first phase of the experiment, subjects were paired with
non-cagemates of the opposite sex. Four subjects acted
as non-cagemate partners for other subjects. In the second phase of the experiment, each subject was paired
with his or her mate.
Apparatus
Experimenters lured subjects from their home cage to a
transport cage with a raisin, and from the transport cage
to a testing apparatus in a separate room. The apparatus
consisted of three adjacent cages, each measuring approximately 30 × 30 × 30 cm (Figure 1a). The fronts of
the cages were constructed from transparent Plexiglas
panels, whereas the remaining sides were constructed
from metal wire. The Plexiglas panels included doors
with either one hole (side cages) or two holes (center
cage). The experimenter placed the focal subject in the
center cage and, for paired conditions, placed partners
in a randomly chosen side cage. Removable transparent
Plexiglas barriers separated the cages.
The experimenter placed two 45 × 35 cm Plexiglas
trays in front of the cages. Each tray included a small
aluminum shelf stretching the width of the tray, with
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each end connected to a ball-bearing drawer slide. An
acrylic handle was attached to each tray aligned with
the holes in the subject’s cage. Pulling the handle slid
the shelf toward the subject and the adjacent cage.
Experimental procedure
All trials began with a transparent Plexiglas barrier preventing the subject from reaching the two handles. To
begin a trial, the experimenter placed marshmallows on
the metal shelf in the location determined by the trial
type (see below and Figure 1b–e). The experimenter first
placed the two sets of marshmallows in front of the subject (‘inside’ position) then in front of the partner (‘outside’ position). If the condition required no marshmallows in a given location, the experimenter simulated
placing marshmallows there using the same movements
in all trials. This avoided signaling the condition to the
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subjects, forcing them to attend to the distribution of
food. After placing the food, the experimenter removed
the front barrier, and the subject had 3 s to attempt to
pull the handle and 30 s to get the food. If the subject did
not touch the handle within 3 s or retrieve the food after
30 s, the experimenter replaced the barrier and recorded
the failure. Choice was measured as the first touch of a
handle. After touching a handle, the experimenter slid
the non-chosen handle out of reach. After the subject obtained the food, the experimenter drew the handle back
to the initial position, replaced the barrier, and removed
any unconsumed food.
Trial types, conditions, sessions, and phases
Subjects experienced four different trial types within every session (Figure 1b–e). In the “Self and Other” trials,
the experimenter placed one marshmallow on each tray

Table 1. Food distributions and outcomes for previous experiments with nonkin
Study
Species
Food distribution
Donation rate
				

Partner present/
absent difference

Silk et al. 2005
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) 	 	 	 
Lousiana		
(1, 0) vs. (1, 1)
0.56
0.02
Texas		
(1, 0) vs. (1, 1)
0.48
0.00
Jensen et al. 2006
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) 	 	 	 
Experiment 1		
(1, 0) vs. (1, 1)
0.87a
0.01
Experiment 2		
(0, 0) vs. (0, 1)
0.20a
0.03
Experiment 3		
(0, 0) vs. (0, 1)
0.08a
0.04
Vonk et al. 2008
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) 	 	 	 
Experiment 2		
(1, 0) vs. (1, 1)
0.48
0.05
Burkart et al. 2007
Common marmoset (Callithrix jacchus) 	 	 	 
Cagemates/related		
(0, 0) vs. (0, 1)
0.55a
0.10a
a
Unrelated		
(0, 0) vs. (0, 1)
0.60
0.20a
de Waal et al. 2008
Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) 	 	 	 
Nonkin-1 and -2		
(1, 0) vs. (1, 1)
0.62–0.65a, b
No absent condition
Kin		
(1, 0) vs. (1, 1)
0.73a, b
No absent condition
Stranger		
(1, 0) vs. (1, 1)
0.46b
No absent condition
Nonkin inequity		
(L, 0) vs. (L, H)c
0.53
No absent condition
Kin inequity		
(L, 0) vs. (L, H)c
0.58
No absent condition
Lakshminarayanan
Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)
and Santos 2008 		

(H, L) vs. (H, H)c
(L, L) vs. (L, H)c

0.62a, d
0.62a, d

0.08a, d
0.08a, d

Cronin et al. 2009
Cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) 	 	 	 
Experiment 1		
(1, 0) vs. (1, 1)
0.56a
0.04
Experiment 2		
(0, 0) vs. (0, 1)
0.33a
0.03
Means are taken directly from text or estimated from figures
a. Differs from chance (0.50 for donation rate and 0.0 for partner present/absent difference) at α = 0.05
b. Excludes data on individuals with side bias
c. H high preferred reward (grape for de Waal et al. 2008, marshmallow for Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008), L low preferred reward (apple for de Waal et al. 2008, celery for Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008)
d. Though both conditions were conducted, performance did not differ across conditions, so only pooled mean was given in the
text
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Figure 1. Apparatus and trial types. a) The apparatus consisted of
three adjacent cages and two trays with handles accessible to the center cage. From the center cage, the subject could pull one of the two
handles to deliver food to him- or herself and to either a partner or an
empty cage. b) In Self and Other trials, food was placed in all four possible positions. Pulling the trays delivered food to self and to either the
partner or an empty cage. c) In Other Only trials, food was placed only
in the outside positions, so pulling the tray only delivered food to the
partner or the empty cage. d) and e) In Right Only and Left Only trials, food was placed on only one of the two trays.

in front of the subject and three marshmallows in both
of the outside locations. Three marshmallows were used
in the outside position to maximize the subject’s interest in those payoffs. In the “Other Only” trials, the experimenter placed three marshmallows in both of the
outside locations but no marshmallows in front of the
subject on the inside tray. The “Right Only” and “Left
Only” trials presented the same one versus three marshmallow distribution as in Self and Other, but only on the
right or left side of the apparatus. The one versus three
design set up an inequity between partners, to which I
return in the Discussion.
Subjects experienced three conditions. In the Partner
Absent/Barrier condition, only the subject was tested
with both cage barriers in place. In the Partner Absent/
No Barrier condition, only the subject was tested with
one of the cage barriers removed, such that the subject
could access food in both the inside and outside positions for that tray. In the Partner Present condition,
the subject was tested with the partner placed in a randomly chosen side cage, and with the transparent barriers in place so that the tamarins could see each other,
but not physically interact.
All sessions consisted of 14 trials. To facilitate the
subject’s ability to discriminate the different payoffs, the
trial types followed a fixed order within a session. The
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first two trials were Right Only and Left Only trials, randomly ordered. The next four trials were Other Only trials, and the final eight trials were Self and Other trials.
For the Self and Other trials in the Partner Absent/No
Barrier condition, the side with the barrier was switched
after four trials, so subjects had to track which side offered the highest payoffs.
For each of two phases (see below), subjects completed 10 replicates of the following series of sessions:
a Partner Absent/Barrier session, then a Partner Absent/No Barrier session, then a Partner Present session.
To pass a Partner Absent session, the subjects must have
chosen correctly for all Right Only and Left Only trials.
In no barrier sessions, they must have made no more
than one mistake (meaning pulling the handle that delivers food behind barrier) in all Self and Other trials
and Other Only trials. In barrier sessions, subjects could
pull on no more than one Other Only trial but could pull
either side on Self and Other trials. If a subject did not
pass a session, it was repeated until the subject passed.
In the first phase, subjects were paired with unrelated
partners from another cage (non-cagemates). In the second phase, subjects were paired with their mates.
Predictions
If the tamarins have other-regarding preferences,
they should preferentially pull the tool that gives food
to their partner in both the Other Only and the Self and
Other trials in the Partner Present condition. If they do
not have other-regarding preferences, then they should
pull the two tools at chance levels. It is also possible
that they either act spitefully or perceive the payoffs as
asymmetric, and then they may preferentially pull the
tool associated with the empty cage. In addition, if the
tamarins are motivated by altruism, then they should
pull the tool more often for Other Only trials in the Partner Present condition compared to the Partner Absent/
Barrier condition. If, however, they do not show a difference in these conditions, this suggests that they either
do not attend to or care about rewards for others. If the
presence or absence of a payoff for themselves does not
influence their decisions, they should donate equally
frequently in the Other Only and Self and Other trials
in the Partner Present condition. Finally, if they understand the apparatus and situation, they should preferentially pull for the open compartment in both the Other
Only and the Self and Other trials in the Partner Absent/No Barrier condition. I use a significance level of
α = 0.05 to test these predictions.
Results
In the non-cagemate phase, the tamarins pulled one of
the two tools in almost every trial for all treatments in
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Figure 2. Pattern of pulling across conditions. a) Tamarins pulled one of the
two tools in almost 100% of the trials in
all conditions except the Other Only trials in both the Partner Absent/Barrier
and Partner Present conditions. Pulling did not differ across these two conditions. b) To investigate whether the
subjects preferentially pulled one of the
tools, a ‘correct’ pull was defined differently depending on the condition. In the
Partner Absent/Barrier condition, there
is no partner present, and the subject
cannot access either adjacent compartment. Since there is no correct response
in this condition, pulling the right tool
was randomly chosen as a correct response. In the Partner Absent/No Barrier condition, no partner was placed in
the adjacent cage, but one of the barriers
was removed to give access to the adjacent compartments. Thus, a correct pull
was one which delivered food to the side
with no barrier. In the Partner Present
condition, a partner was present in one
of the two adjacent compartments. Here,
the trials in which the subject pulled the
tool delivering food to the partner were
scored as a correct choice. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

which food was available for them (Figure 2a). When
food was not available for them (Other Only trials in
Partner Absent/Barrier and Partner Present conditions),
the mean (±95% CI) proportion of trials in which subjects pulled one of the two tools (overall pull rate pooled
over subject means) dropped to 0.10 ± 0.11 in the Partner
Absent/Barrier condition and 0.21 ± 0.19 in the Partner
Present condition. They did not pull differently across
these two conditions (paired t-test: t 4 = 0.69, P = 0.53,
h = 0.31), indicating that the presence or absence of a
partner did not influence their pulling. In the Partner
Present condition, they pulled much less when they did
not receive food, suggesting that donor payoffs greatly
influenced their choice.
To investigate preferential food giving, I measured
the proportion of trials in which the subject pulled the
tray nearest the partner (number of pulls for partner/
total number of pulls), looking for a departure from
chance performance of 0.50 (Figure 2b). For Self and
Other trials in the Partner Present condition, the mean
proportion of pulls for the non-cagemate partner was
0.50 ± 0.06, which did not differ from that expected by
chance (one-sample t-test: μ = 0.50, t 4 = 0.11, P = 0.92,

h = 0.01). The proportion of pulls for the partner did
not differ in the first and last five sessions (first half:
0.47 ± 0.07, second half: 0.54 ± 0.07). In Other Only trials in which subjects pulled one of the tools (only 21%
of the trials), they preferentially pulled for their partner
0.56 ± 0.38 of the time, again, not differing from chance
performance (one-sample t-test: μ = 0.50, t 4 = 0.41,
P = 0.70, h = 0.11) and not differing from the Self and
Other trials (paired t-test: t 4 = 0.40, P = 0.71, h = 0.11).
Thus, the subjects did not preferentially give food to
their non-cagemate partners in the presence or absence
of reward for themselves; when they did not receive
food (Other Only trials), they rarely pulled at all.
To ensure that they understood the apparatus, I compared the Self and Other trials to the Other Only trials
in the Partner Absent/No Barrier condition. The subjects correctly pulled the handle that delivered food to
the adjacent compartment in almost every trial (Self and
Other: 0.99 ± 0.02, Other Only: 0.96 ± 0.02; Figure 2b), indicating that they understood the apparatus.
In the cagemate phase, the overall pull rate was similar to the non-cagemate phase, with high pulling rates
only for conditions in which food was available to the
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subject and low pull rates (Other Only in Partner Absent/Barrier: 0.05 ± 0.04; Other Only in Partner Present:
0.14 ± 0.12) otherwise (Figure 2a). Preferential pulling
for the subjects’ mates in the Self and Other trials in the
Partner Present condition was 0.55 ± 0.07, not differing
from chance performance (one-sample t-test: μ = 0.50, t
4 = 2.00, P = 0.12, h = 0.10). The proportion of pulls for
the partner did not differ in the first and last five sessions (first half: 0.55 ± 0.15, second half: 0.56 ± 0.14).
In the Other Only trials in the Partner Present condition, subjects preferentially pulled for their mates
in 0.36 ± 0.18 of the trials. Though subjects pulled less
than expected by chance (one-sample t-test: μ = 0.50, t
3 = −2.48, P = 0.09, h = 0.29), this is based on very few trials (28 of the 202 Other Only trials in the Partner Present
condition) and is not a significant difference. Also, based
on only a few trials, Other Only and Self and Other differ, although not significantly (paired t-test: t 3 = 2.79,
P = 0.07, h = 0.39). Again, the subjects pulled correctly
in the Partner Absent/No Barrier condition (Self and
Other: 0.97 ± 0.07, Other Only: 0.92 ± 0.10; Figure 2b).
Though subjects did not differ from chance in the
Self and Other trials for either the non-cagemate or
mate phases, a comparison of these two phases shows
a significant difference (paired t-test: t 4 = 4.45, P = 0.01,
h = 0.10). In particular, four out of five subjects pulled
slightly more (mean difference = 0.05) for their mates
than for non-cagemates (Table 2).
Discussion
To summarize, the tamarins always pulled one of the
tools when they received food but rarely pulled when
they did not receive food. Thus, they treated the situation quite differently depending on their own payoffs:
a payoff for the donor motivated higher pulling rates.
When the subjects did pull the tool, however, they did
not preferentially give food to or withhold food from
their partners in any conditions. The comparison between the non-cagemate to mate conditions did show
a statistically significant effect of giving food more to
mates. This result suffers from two difficulties, however. First, the effect is quite small (0.50 vs. 0.56), likely
too small to be biologically meaningful. Second, all subjects in this experiment experienced the non-cagemate
condition before the mate condition. Thus, it is possible
that any differences between these two conditions could
have resulted from the order in which they were experienced. The tamarins could have become more generous over time, biasing the later mate condition toward
more generous behavior. Further tests with randomized
ordering would address these issues.
One drawback of this experiment is the use of one
food item for the subject and three food items for the
partner. Though I used these amounts to increase the
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attention of the subject to the partner’s payoff, this resulted in an inequality in the payoff distribution. Like
the literature on other-regarding preferences, research
on primates’ ability to detect and respond to inequitable
payoffs has resulted in conflicting accounts. Following
Brosnan and de Waal’s (2003) original study on capuchin monkeys, some studies have found that chimpanzees and capuchins demonstrate an aversion to inequity
(Brosnan et al. 2005; van Wolkenten et al. 2007), whereas
others have failed to find this effect in the same species
(Bräuer et al. 2006; Dubreuil et al. 2006; Fontenot et al.
2007; Roma et al. 2006; Silberberg et al. 2009), including Brosnan and de Waal’s (2003) male capuchin monkeys. If tamarins prefer equitable payoff distributions,
this could explain why they did not preferentially give
food in this experiment. This seems unlikely for two reasons, however. First, previous tests of inequity aversion
in cotton-top tamarins did not show an effect of inequitable payoffs to partners (Neiworth et al. 2009). Second, if the tamarins wanted to avoid giving the larger
amount to their partner, they should have preferentially
withheld food from the partner. The tamarins exhibited
complete indifference in their choices, however, suggesting that they simply did not attend to the payoffs of
their partner. Nevertheless, it is possible that observing
the partner receiving a larger payoff reduced the motivation of the subjects to the point that they became indifferent to the outcome of the partner.
These data replicate the negative results of Cronin et
al. (2009), with cotton-top tamarins not giving food to or
withholding food from other individuals. Like Cronin et
al., these results conflict with the cooperative breeding
hypothesis of other-regarding preferences proposed by
Burkart et al. (2007). In this paradigm, the Other Only
condition is analogous to the (0, 1) against (0, 0) condition used by Burkart et al. and Cronin et al. When the
subject received no food, they rarely pulled either tool
(5–21% of trials) and exhibited no preferential pulling
for the partner. Though common marmosets show generous behavior, it does not generalize to other cooperatively breeding callitrichid species. This combined with
the data on the non-cooperatively breeding capuchins
(de Waal et al. 2008; Lakshminarayanan and Santos
2008) suggests that cooperative breeding is neither necessary nor sufficient as an explanation of other-regarding preferences.
These data add to the currently conflicted state of
studies on other-regarding preferences in primates
(Yamamoto and Tanaka 2009). Humans, marmosets,
and capuchins demonstrate other-regarding preferences, (Burkart et al. 2007; de Waal et al. 2008; Fehr et
al. 2008; Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008), but tamarins do not. To further complicate the situation, chimpanzees show preferences in some situations (Warneken
et al. 2007; Warneken and Tomasello 2006) but not others (Jensen et al. 2006; Silk et al. 2005; Vonk et al. 2008).

Donor

payoffs and other-regarding preferences in cotton-top tamarins

What underlies this variation? One obvious factor that
could play an important role is food (Yamamoto and
Tanaka 2009). Anecdotally for the tamarins, it appeared
as though the presence of food for themselves prevented them from even attending to the payoffs for the
partner. Yet, Lakshminarayanan and Santos found that
capuchins preferentially gave food to partners even in
the presence of food for themselves, so they clearly attended to the payoffs of their partner. Burkart et al.
did not offer food to the marmoset subjects expressly
to avoid the motivational problem of focusing on food
for self and not attending to the food for others. Nevertheless, in the present experiment, even when the tamarins received no food for themselves and thus could
not be distracted by this (Other Only trials), they rarely
pulled at all and if they did pull, they did not differentiate between giving food to or withholding food from
a partner. Though food may be important, it does not
completely explain the pattern of data seen in primates.
Presenting non-food rewards may, however, be useful in testing other-regarding preferences. The cases in
which chimpanzees seem to show other-regarding preferences, for instance, are those in which they offer targeted helping rather than food (Warneken et al. 2007;
Warneken and Tomasello 2006). Thus, testing non-food
rewards may offer more instances of other-regarding
preferences in primates.
In addition to food payoffs, the relationship with the
partner could be quite relevant to other-regarding preferences. Though de Waal et al. (2008) found differences
in donation rates for kin, nonkin, and strangers in capuchins, the data presented here, along with Burkart et
al. (2007) and Cronin et al. (2009), suggest that tamarins
and marmosets do not show differences between kin,
nonkin, and mates. Takimoto et al. (2009) found differences for subordinates and dominants in capuchins, but
this has not been tested in callitrichids.
One concern regarding the existing data on primate
other-regarding preferences is the effect sizes of preferences. The marmosets in Burkart et al. (2007), for in-
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stance, only pulled for the partners in around 55–60% of
the trials, and the capuchins pulled in 62 and 62–66% of
the trials, respectively, in Lakshminarayanan and Santos
(2008) and de Waal et al. (2008). The Jensen et al. (2006)
results demonstrate the highest departure from chance
performance of 50% (Table 1), but, critically, there is no
difference between partner present and absent conditions in that experiment. For the experiments with positive results, the mean difference between partner present and partner absent conditions was 10–20 and 8%,
respectively, for Burkhart et al. and Lakshminarayanan
and Santos (de Waal et al. did not include a partner absent condition—see Table 1). Though these overall donation rates and mean differences reach statistical significance, the effect is not as strong as one might expect
if these species have a strong preference to help others:
the biological significance of other-regarding preferences remains unclear.
Studies on other species demonstrate higher levels of no-cost donation. The blue jays playing a cooperative game donated food to their partner in about 74%
of their trials (Stevens and Stephens 2004). Though they
appear more cooperative than the primates tested so far,
the methodology differs in the blue jay experiment. Both
blue jay subjects made cooperative choices repeatedly,
allowing cooperation contingent on their partner’s behavior. The jays, in fact, did cooperate more often following their partner’s cooperation than following defection. This potential element of reciprocity may have
facilitated donation. Fehr et al. (2008) conducted an experiment on human children based on the primate experimental design. They showed that 3–6 year olds donated at rates around 60% (comparable to what we see
with the primates), but 7–8 year olds donated in 78%
of trials, a clear demonstration of other-regarding preferences. Though not defined in the literature, I propose
that other-regarding preferences should require a relatively high donation rate and consistent effects across
individuals. Unfortunately, Burkhart et al. (2007) and de
Waal et al. (2008) do not present individual data. Stud-

Table 2. Individual pulling rates and number of trials for select conditions
Total pulling 				

Preferential pullinga

		
		

Partner Absent/Barrier
(Other Only)		

Partner Present 		
(Other Only)

Partner Present		
(Other Only)		

Partner Present
(Self and Other)	 	 

		

Non-cagemate

Mate

Non-cagemate

Mate

Non-cagemate

Mate

Non-cagemate

Mate

EN
F
ID
M
PB
M
RB
F
SH
F
Mean	 	

0.11 (44)
0.22 (48)
0.00 (40)
0.12 (101)
0.03 (48)
0.10

0.11 (57)
0.03 (52)
0.03 (40)
0.05 (57)
0.06 (36)
0.06

0.18 (40)
0.13 (40)
0.03 (40)
0.40 (40)
0.33 (40)
0.21

0.20 (40)
0.08 (40)
0.00 (40)
0.22 (37)
0.19 (42)
0.14

0.43 (40)
0.20 (40)
1.00 (40)
0.69 (40)
0.46 (40)
0.56

0.38 (40)
0.33 (40)
NA (40)
0.22 (37)
0.50 (42)
0.36

0.55 (80)
0.51 (80)
0.54 (80)
0.49 (80)
0.43 (80)
0.50

0.61 (80)
0.58 (80)
0.59 (80)
0.49 (77)
0.49 (78)
0.55

Subject

Sex

a. Preferential pulling for partner in trials in which the subjects pulled one of the two tools
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ies that do present individual data (Cronin et al. 2009;
Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008; Vonk et al. 2008)
demonstrate high variability across subjects, with most
subjects showing no differences between partner present and absent conditions (see also Table 2). In the absence of high donation rates and inter-individual consistency, perhaps these effects are more aptly labeled
“other-regarding biases”.
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